Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

James R. McPhie v. John W. Turner : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Vernon B. Romney; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McPhie v. Turner, No. 9163 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3537

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
ol the State ol Utah

F~ LE
D
1960

JAMES R. McPHIE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,- - "<..1

19

-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden of
Utah State Prison,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

PRINTERS INC., SUGAR HOUSE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS____________________________________________ 1
STATEMENT OF POINTS_______________________________________ 2
ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------- 2
POINT I. APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF
SENTENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD
NOT BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEFINITELY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE
COURT THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED
HIM TO SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE __________ 2

CON CLUS I 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
CASES CITED

Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170_______________ 3
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044___________________ 3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
ol the State ol Utah
JAMES R. McPHIE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs-

Case No. 9163

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden of
Utah State Prison,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not dispute appellant's statement of
facts.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD NOT
BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEFINITELY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE COURT
THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED HIM TO
SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD NOT
BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEFINITELY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE COURT
THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED HIM TO
SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE.
The court, in the interest of justice and in the proper
exercise of its discretion, granted appellant McPhie a stay
of execution of sentence and placed him under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole Department.
McPhie was not placed "on probation" at all even though
ordered under the Department's supervision during the
pendency of his stay. The stay date was extended from
time to time until January 9, 1959. It expired and McPhie
was ordered to serve the proper sentence for the crime
committed.
Counsel for McPhie makes a great point of his having
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been placed on probation. He was not placed on probation.
The court's order said nothing about probation at all. All
it did was place him under the supervision of the Department.
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that
he was placed on some sort of probation, he certainly cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to
have been placed on probation indefinitely during good
behavior.
The rule in the State of Utah in regard to a person
situated as appellant McPhie was, is given in the case of
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170. It is this:
when one convicted of a crime and sentenced has been
given a stay of execution to a date certain, and the date
has expired, he is not entitled to a hearing before being
committed to Prison.
The court clearly distinguished the Demmick case
from that of State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044,
and certain other cases. The pertinent words of Justice
McDonough follow:
"The Zolantakis case was decided on appeal from
the order revoking the suspension of sentence.
Therein we stated [70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1046]:
~In the absence of -statutory authority, in this
jurisdiction, district courts do not have inherent
power to suspend sentences except for some definite period and for some specific temporary purpose * * *. Under the statute * * * trial courts are
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not given authority to suspend sentences as a matter of favor or grace, but only when "it appears
compatible with the public interest.'
We also said:
'The purpose of the law permitting suspension
of sentence is clearly reformatory. If those who are
to be reformed cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orders contained in the suspension of sentences, then we n1ay well expect the law to fail in
its purpose. Reformation can certainly best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straightforward
treatment of the person sought to be reformed. It
would therefore seem, both upon authority and
principle, that when a sentence is suspended during good behavior, without reservations, the person
whose sentence is thus suspended has a vested
right to :rely thereon so long as such condition is
complied with. * * * Such right may not be alternately granted and denied without just cause.'
But here we are met by respondent's -contention
that the use of the writ of habeas corpus is restricted to the correction of jurisdictional errors and
errors so gross as in effect to deprive one of constitutional substantive or procedural rights. Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91, opinion on
petition for rehearing. We shall assun1e for the
purposes of this case that it would constitute such
deprivation of appellant's rights, if Judge Ellett on
November 28, the date of sentence, placed appellant on probation during good behavior; and, thereafter revoked such order without notice and
hearing.
Furthermore, we shall assume-and the proposition must be conceded- that the mere summary
summoning of one on probation to the chambers

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

of the sentencing judge to be there cross-examined
concerning his conduct either before or after the
order granting probation, would fall short of according him the hearing the law prescribes. The
prln1ary question, therefore, is: Was appellant, on
the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay of
execution and placed on probation during good
behavior.
The question must be answered in the negative.
The order, itself, specifically makes the stay one
until a definite time. * * *"
The court further stated at page 477 as follows:
"Whether one convicted of crime, and subject to
punishment therefor, should be placed on probation is a matter in such court's discretion. It would
be but salutary procedure in the exercise of such
discretion for a trial judge who is doubtful whether
the granting of probation during good behavior is
compatible with the public interest, to make such
investigation as his judgment dictates as to the
attitudes of the person convicted. Nor do we see
anything irregular in the court's action in this
case in requiring compliance with conditions us. ually imposed on those placed on probation during
good behavior, as a condition to the keeping in
force of the stay order until the date of its expiration. The appellant, it appears from the record,
could not have been misled thereby. Indeed the
record below reveals that what in truth shocked
appellant's sense of justice was that he was unable
to tell a story which the sentencing judge would
believe. However, the burden of persuasion was
upon hilm; and the one to be persuaded was the
judge in whose power it lay to grant an additional
stay of execution; not the court sitting below in
this proceeding, nor this court on appeal."
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In the Demmick case, Chief Justice Larson concurred
specially, and in doing so made the following statement
which we believe properly covers the case at hand:
"The record is definite that sentence was imposed
upon Demmick on November 28, 1942, and a stay
of execution was granted until January 4, 1943.
Such stay of execution operated only to delay commitment until the day certain fixed in the stay. At
the expiration of that time, commitment issues as
of course, unless the court by order grants a further stay. * * *"
The fact that appellant's stay date was continued from
time to time to new dates certain is not sufficient to remove it from the confines of the Demmick decision.
Appellant's appeal, therefore, has no foundation and
must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
'The appeal of appellant James R. McPhie does not
set forth grounds entitling him to a reversal of the finding
of the court below and should therefore be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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